I have played more Cold War Warsaw Pact games versus
NATO than most, at least in terms of the number of different rule sets I have
used. This has included the many civilian wargame rules such as WRG modern
warfare rules and Tim Gow's NATO Brigade Commander, but I have also played
professional military games such as 'Contact!' (Canadian Wargame rules, 1980),
Dunn Kemp (1978-, American), Battlegroup Trainer (UK Army) and games with BAE
Systems Ltd. While playing these games, I have noted one major trend , I have
never lost playing the Warsaw Pact side. Whether playing with 1/35 scale tanks
on Knuston lawn to traditional wargames on the tabletop, to games played in
1/300 scale on the floor of a WWII aircraft hanger, my 'side' has won. Some of
these game were using rules of my own devising, but the majority were rules
written by others, including operational analysis establishments. This article
is about why Russian Tactics seem to work in wargaming.
For the purposes of this article, I have used the
terms Russia, Soviet and Warsaw Pact with reference to tactics as
interchangeable.
Russian Tactics 'The tactics were based on the Russian
experience on the Eastern front during World War II; where very similar tactics
successfully overcame problems of largely inferior technology, motivation, a
multitude of languages and a frequently illiterate army to beat the Germans
back to the gates of Berlin.
In the West, it has become common to deride Soviet
style tactics as inferior and second rate. This is incorrect; Soviet tactics
were different as the Soviet commanders had to solve very different tactical
problems than those faced by the technology based NATO armies. ' (Curry,
2008[1] )
In NATO flexibility, was seen as essential part of
junior commanders training in direct contract to the more rigid Soviet system.
NATO tactics were more a system of principles, that junior ranks would learn to
apply in innovative ways on the battlefield. For example, Mass, concentration,
economy of force, all round defence etc… and a series of battle drills as the
basis for commanders developing their own tactics.
An example of a good NATO tactic against an enemy
advance is for NATO tanks to find positions where they can fire 1 shot at the
attackers and then reverse quickly into cover. i.e. before the enemy can locate
them and return fire. The NATO tanks then retreat out of sight to another
prepared position. Using this tactic on the table top can allow the defender to
get the majority of their tanks to fire 5 or 6 shots while retreating, say 2/3rds
of the way down the table. At this point the tanks should combine with the dug
in infantry to fight the main battle on the defenders chosen ground. This
tactic works well on a wargaming table covered with a realistic amount of
scenery to obstruct the line of sight.
The only problem is that just like real life, it takes
the wargamer time to learn and practise NATO type tactics.
By contrast, Russian tactics are straightforward and
can be learnt in an afternoon by reading a good book on their tactics. My suspicion
is that given two novice wargamers, the novice commanding the Russian side
would win as their tactics are easier to learn.
Concentration Many years ago, I learnt the value of
concentration in wargaming while playing a fantasy wargame. The enemy dragon
was coming and it was the most deadly potential weapon on the Middle Earth
battlefield. My solution was to concentrate the fire of every single archer on
my side against this single target. Even at long odds, the sheer number of
attacking dice brought down this potential battle wining dragon before it could
cause significant damage.
Russian tactics are excellent at encouraging
concentration of fire. Russians units had less artillery observers than western
counter-parts, which encouraged Russian divisional commanders to use the
maximum of artillery when a target was identified. Russian tactics are very
clear about the value of positioning forces so the maximum number can engage
the enemy at the same time.
Close to Contact Some Soviet weapons were largely inferior
(perhaps at 2/3rds of the effectiveness of western weapons), in particular at
long range. Their method of counter acting this was aiming to keep the advance
moving in column until hit by effective enemy fire (e.g. first tank is blown
up), then spend a minute forming into line abreast, followed by a charge.
If a company was engaged at the range of a mile, then
it would aim to be on the enemy position in three minutes if it was in column
(i.e. not expecting to be hit by effective fire) or 2 minutes if already formed
for an advance to contact. Russian units do not fire and manoeuvre at below
company level (at least while in a mechanised battle). The second company would
aim to be on the enemy position as soon as the tactical situation permitted
e.g. 2-3 minute after the first company has reached the enemy position. On the
battlefield it meant that defending enemy anti-tank guided missile launchers
would get perhaps 2 missiles off, and hand held anti-tank weapons perhaps 1 or
2 before the battle was fought at point blank range.
On the wargaming table, the rapid 'close to contact'
minimises the NATO advantage in weaponry. Advantages, such as superior NATO
weapon sights, matter little if tanks and AFVs are firing at targets at less
than 200 metres.
Morale By this I am referring to the morale of the
actual players, not the simulated troops on the table top. The correct
application of Russian tactics can undermine the morale of opponents. I first
noticed this at a free kriegspiel invasion of the Isle of Wight, where as a
Russian advisor I planned the invasion force to arrive in the same order as the
order of march of a Soviet regiment. It took me 15 minutes to produce the
shipping and logistic plan based on Soviet doctrine. Apparently, the other HQ
found it most off putting for their opponents to plan so quickly and then be so
confident as to sit around drinking beer for the next two hours. As the game
proceeded, the other HQ was 'psyched' out by the speed of the decision making
within the Russian HQ.
Whether playing alternate or simultaneous moves, after
the initial plan, it normally takes moments for the Russians to move all of
forces compared to the NATO side. While NATO is planning the position of each
smallest unit, the Russians simply decide the correct Axis of advance and then
all the armour lines up behind the lead vehicle. It can be very disconcerting
for a player to find their opponent finishes their move in a fraction of the
time they need. To work, NATO tactics take more time and effort to apply on the
table top, just as they do in real life. The combination of speed, concentration of armour and
artillery support and sheer numbers, seems to undermine the other players.
Modern Misconceptions various Arab armies have used
Russian taught tactics, with Russian equipment, and lost, such as in the Arab
Israel wars or the first Gulf War. In the first Gulf War, Coalition tanks were
immune to Iraq tank guns, even at short range.
As reported by James Dunnigan in his Book 'How to Make
War', the Iraq's economised by using cheaply produced local tank shells,
instead of the expensive high cost Russian kit. A tank shell is 60% of a modern
main battle tank and the Russian equivalent of an American depleted Uranium
tank round would have penetrated Western armour at 1-2km. The western military
use PC based, training tools for tank crews; some ignorant people criticise the
tool developers for not making the Western tanks immune to enemy fire (as they
were largely in the 1st Gulf War). This criticism is not justified as it should
be assumed that an enemy might have bought a consignment of modern tank shells,
anti-tank guided missiles etc. from Russia or China. Therefore, suggesting that
a main battle tank is practically immune to enemy fire might teach a very wrong
lesson to their crews.
Arab tactics differ from Soviet tactics significantly.
Tactics of Soviet Ground Forces, (Army Code 71031, Restricted, 1975, page v)
states 'differences between Soviet Tactics and those reported as used by Arabs.
Although the latter had Soviet equipment and advisors, it does not follow that
Arab tactics were intended to be carbon copies of Soviet tactics, and in many
cases they were clearly not.' Soviet advisors were reportedly frustrated by
Arab armies not applying what they were taught. The Soviet view was their
tactics were designed for a poorly trained, illiterate army with communication
problems, using Soviet kit, and the Arabs were wrong not to apply them straight
out of the training manuals. The Soviet studied military history more thoroughly
than any modern army and to suggest that the result of this work was to produce
tactics that did not work is a misconception. They are different from NATO
tactics as they had different problems to overcome. The fact the Arabs failed
to apply the tactics as taught is a reflection on the military and society
culture in those countries.
Example 1: The scene was set in a WWII aircraft hanger used
by BAE Systems limited for some experiments on situational awareness on the
modern battlefield. The game was played over a 1/300 scale model, representing
a portion of West Germany near the 'Hof Gap', that was large enough to be
walked on.
The scenario had been played 80 times before, as
repetition was necessary to produce valid data. I was on the attacking team
against staff who had knew the rules, terrain and the scenario inside out (and
back to front). What the staff did not realise was that all of the attacking
team had commanded 'Orange forces' at various levels during NATO exercises. We
were Russians and we intended to act like them.
The terrain analysis was simple. A stream ran across
our front, overlooked by high ground on the other side. There was a town to the
left as we faced our axis of advance and in the far distance (15k) was a larger
river, with a few crossing points dominated by a few hills. There were an
appropriate number of woods, farms, roads and tracks.
Our plan was simple, we would advance on three axis,
with a reserve behind. Which ever axis broke through first would become the
main axis of advance and all support would be shifted to that axis. We took
approximately 10 minutes to make our plan, which caused much amusement to the
other side. They expected us to spend 2 hours discussing phased lines of
advance, artillery targets, giving detailed orders etc…
The battle started with an artillery/ rocket/ mortar
barrage reminiscent of the Somme. While NATO armies might carefully recce enemy
positions or rely of calling in supporting fire as targets were required, we
were a Russian army and we had little confidence in getting the necessary
support quickly. We simply identified any likely positions overlooking the
stream and hit them hard with a pre-prepared fire plan.
There could have been minefields to our front, but
Russian doctrine was to advance as if they were not there. So the NATO
defenders were a little surprised as there was no tentative recce, no checking
for minefields but mechanised companies advancing at maximum speed on three
axis. This ruined their plan of taking time to identify our main thrust and
counter-attacking it.
As we entered the town on our left, it became obvious
that the town was well defended. So, in line with Russian doctrine (Towns
should be bypassed), infantry were debussed to engage in FIBUA, while the main
column identified a gap in the defences, one street wide, and the battalion
went straight through the town and out the other side… the defenders were
shocked at being bypassed and their commander had what can only be described as
'command paralysis'.
The NATO counter-attack hit our centre axis of
advance. Our centre axis ground to a halt. rather than reinforce failure, the
reserves switched to follow another axis. The divisional artillery support also
switched to the other two successful axis.
Our advance was difficult to halt, as every time a
main road was blocked, the advance switched to the next adjacent road. Russian
policy was any road heading west would do (as they come from a country of poor
roads).
At every possible opportunity, the Russian advance
switched back to column formation for maximum speed. The speed reduced NATO
support, as their mortar/ artillery positions had to move as they felt
threatened by the speed of our advance.
The other side started to panic as the situation was
changing too quickly and we seemed to be playing by different rules to what
they were used to. I knew we were winning when an umpire tried to warn me about
potential ambushes and why my column should slow down (just in case).
The game ended with the right hand Russian axis
occupying the high ground overlooking the crossing points the enemy needed to
retreat over. It had a full division's worth of artillery to supplement its
tank guns and anti-tank missiles. The scattered NATO forces had been bypassed
and were out of supply and their retreat route was covered by direct enemy fire
and artillery.
Example 2: Conference of Wargamers, July 2007
As the Iraq defenders of Kuwait Airfield, we were
playing Tim Gow's NATO Brigade Commanders Rules. Historically, we were playing
merely static targets for the American's to practise their gunnery. Under Mike
Elliot's command, Bde commanders John Salt and I deployed just behind the ridge
line well forward of the Kuwait Airport.
We were somewhat concerned by the clear superiority of
the American kit. A lot of their kit was lightly armoured, but could easily
destroy us at 3-4km range. Therefore we waited in our reverse slope positions
(with some trepidation).
The first American's arrived and dropped straight down
the valley between 2 companies of our tanks either side. Our somewhat surprised
4 companies of tanks opened up at 1 km at the soft skinned vehicles and upset
them somewhat.
The Americans then retreated back down the valley
while they brought up tanks in support. We were somewhat surprised to find they
decided to reorganise just out of sight, but just 1 km away from us.
As per our plan, we then err… charged. We put a motor
rifle battalion straight into the American column from the front, while our two
companies of tanks took up firing positions either side of the enemy flanks. Of
course, we took huge casualties, but our waves of attacks finally rolled up the
American battalion. When the first motor rifle battalion was destroyed, we sent
in the next. We even threw our recce vehicles and the Bde HQ into the battle.
On the other flank, the American tanks finally arrived
and although we hit the American soft skinned vehicles who were first around
the corner of the hills, we had to withdraw behind the nearest build up area to
avoid destruction in a long range gunnery duel in the open.
At the end of the game our heavily attrited division
was reorganising at the Bagdad Airport, with the surviving American's occupying
the ridges overlooking the airfield.
The rules work well and reflected the outcome I would
have expected using other sets of wargaming rules. American kit is awesome, but
you must keep your distance. A lot of the vehicles are lightly armoured. Never
let Russian style armies get within 1 km of you. They will use the one tactic
they have perfected, the charge. At point- blank range, Western armies
technological superiority is less of an advantage. Poor tactics can make even
the best army in the world loose.
Wargaming and Warsaw Pact Tactics Russian tactics seem
to work as they are simple to learn, encourage concentration of firepower and
the speed of their application can be most off putting to the other side. For
me, applying Russian mechanised tactics has worked on the table top to the
extent that I have never lost a game as the Russians. The big question is would
they have worked if the Cold War had turned hot on the Central Front in Europe?
References
[1] Curry John (editor) 2008 Contact! The Canadian
Army Tactical Wargaming Rules (1980)
Source: http://www.wargaming.co/rules/dunnkempf/articles/whyrussiantactics.htm
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